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ABSTRACT
This paper reflects on the background and merits of the forthcoming Irish challenge to the first
pillar legal base of the Data Retention Directive in C-301/06 Ireland v. Council and European
Parliament 1 and attempts to place the case in a wider context, that of the relationship between
Ireland and Europe. The paper considers, in particular, the nature of Irish practice with regard
to litigating at European level and considers the low number of preliminary references from Irish
courts to the Court of Justice and the historically low level of intervention of Government in
cases before Court of Justice, despite the extraordinary composition of the Irish Supreme
Court. Issues as to States litigating at European level and the “repeat player factor” in
European litigation are analysed. The role that competence or legal base challenges plays in
the dynamic of European relations is reflected on. The caselaw of the Court of Justice on
competence and legal base generally has evolved considerably in recent times and the
changes wrought by the Treaty of Lisbon are discussed briefly. The paper suggests that legal
scholarship benefits from considering the dynamic between States and institutional actors
before the Court of Justice and seeks to outline how legal scholarship could be enriched by
drawing on political science themes in analysing challenges to the legal base of secondary
Community law by Member State challenges.

1

OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5.

1

1. THE DATA RETENTION CASE CHALLENGE: SETTING THE SCENE
Introduction
Ireland has initiated proceedings in Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Council and European
Parliament 2 in order to challenge the validity of the use of Article 95 of the EC Treaty as the
legal basis for the Data Retention Directive. 3 Ireland contends that the correct legal base for
the Directive is in fact Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union. 4 This paper seeks to place
this litigation in a wider context and reflect on Irish litigation relating to the EU legal order. There
appears to be an increasing tendency for Ireland to adopt “Euro-sceptic” strategies in its
dealings at European level, whereby it frequently follows the lead of the United Kingdom in
European affairs, perhaps more so than in its initial years of membership of the EU and the
decision in this challenge will follow shortly after the rejection by the Irish people of the Treaty
of Lisbon. Low rates of preliminary references from the Irish courts, low participation rates as
interveners in litigation before the Court of Justice by the Irish States and a relatively poor
compliance rate by the State with implementation of internal market legislation until recently
have cumulatively characterised Ireland as litigator at European level. It seems difficult to
suggest that Ireland could ever be a “repeat player” at European level, a concept derived from
US political science theory, denoting corporate bodies or associations who litigate frequently or
the converse of a once-off litigator. 5 The case of Ireland v. Council and European Parliament,
however, involves Ireland acting as antagonistic litigator, challenging legal norms within the EU
legal order and indicates a new dynamic in Irish-European litigation. Thus the purpose of the
paper is not to consider the substantive merits of the case but rather to reflect on its impact and
consequences. The trends emerging from distinct time period are set out here and tentative
reflections are drawn therefrom.

(a) Ireland and the Europe Union: A Changing Dynamic?
The Irish Government came under considerable pressure recently not to opt-out of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty of Lisbon negotiations, now designated to have the same
legal effect as the Treaties in the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet ratified. The Irish Government
appeared likely to adopt a similar position to the UK as regards the Charter but relented at the
last minute to pressure, particularly from Trade Union leaders. There are some suggestions
OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5.
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5. Hereinafter
the Data Retention Directive.
4 The reasoning adopted by Ireland in its challenge to the Framework Decision appears to draw heavily upon the
reasoning of the Court of Justice in its decision in 2006 (European Parliament v Council of the European Union (C317/04) [2006] ECR I-4721) annulling the Commission adequacy decision in the Data Protection Directive
Framework, which purported to recognise the US as providing an adequate level of protection for the transfer of
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of
PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (OJ 2004 L 183, p. 83, and corrigendum at OJ 2005 L 255, p. 168).
5 Galanter “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations of the limits of legal change” (1974) 9 Law & Society
95.
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that a major obstacle to ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon other than by referendum would be
hindered by the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. More controversially,
pursuant to a Protocol attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, Ireland is not obliged to take part in, or
be bound by the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.” 6 Ireland and the UK may each
decide to be involved in particular issues - they may opt in or opt out of particular decisions.
This special arrangement for Ireland and the UK has been in existence since these areas came
within the remit of the EU in 1999 in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 7 The Treaty provides for the optout for Ireland and the UK to continue. Ireland has issued a non-legally binding declaration that
it proposes to opt in to decisions in this area to the maximum extent possible and to review the
entire opt-out clause within three years. The Protocol as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon in
this regard remains problematic in so far as it is reviewable 3 years from the date of ratification
of the Treaty and may necessitate another referendum 3 years from the date of which the
Treaty of Lisbon is ratified, if at all. Substantively, the continued policy of exclusion is adopted
by Ireland on grounds of the sanctity of the common law legal system and the peculiarities of
the borders of Ireland the UK. The recent rejection by the Irish people of the Treaty of Lisbon,
discussed below in greater detail, in tandem with the Treaty negotiation stance recently
adopted by Ireland has resulted in a particular dynamic to Irish- European relations and
contextualises the challenge under discussion.
(b) Background to the Data Retention Directive and the Irish challenge
In 2004, France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK introduced a proposal for a draft framework
decision under Title IV EU which would have harmonised data retention obligations of service
providers. Directive 2006/24/EC was subsequently adopted which purported to harmonise the
laws of the Member States with respect to data retention so as to ensure the data is available
to investigate serious crime was adopted pursuant to Article 95 EC in response to terrorism
concerns arising within the European Union, with its preamble specifically and explicitly
referencing the London terrorist attacks of July 2005. 8 However, in the adoption of the
instrument, both Ireland and Slovakia were both outvoted in the Council of Ministers and
notably, the Directive benefited from an unusually speedy conception and publication.
The decision of Ireland to challenge the Directive’s legal validity is closely associated with the
former Minister for Justice, then aggrieved at being outvoted. Two Ministerial appointment have
followed the said Minister in this position on account of domestic political changes 9 and the
extent to which the approach of the State to these proceedings will have changed as a result

Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice and Declaration by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom
and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice.
7 In practice, Ireland has opted in to a number of decisions, for example, in relation to asylum and judicial cooperation and has not exercised its right to opt in to others, for example, border controls. However, Case C-137/05
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union [2007] ECR 0000 entails
that it may be increasingly difficult to “cherry pick” the State’s involvement in this regard.
8 The Directive now imposes far-reaching obligations on the States inter alia, to retain, trace and identify telephone
and Internet data.
9 Minister Michael McDowell T.D. who instigated the litigation at issue lost his seat in the General Election of 2007
and was succeeded by Minister Brian Lenihan T.D. and then Minister Dermot Ahern T.D. more recently in 2008.
6
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remains a difficult question, in so far as the challenge is perceived as being closely associated
with the former Minister only. 10

2. IRELAND IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS IN LITIGATION
(a) Ireland and Article 234 EC preliminary reference ruling data
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Source: Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law
from the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw).

Litigation from the Irish courts to the Court of Justice remains statistically low. In general terms,
the numerical figures as to the number of preliminary references referred by Irish courts and
quasi-judicial bodies to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 234 EC 11 are very
disappointing. A total of 51 preliminary references have been made by the Irish courts to the
European Court of Justice since Ireland first joined the European Union in 1973-2008. 12 In a
thirty year study from the inception of Ireland’s membership (from 1973-2003) a total of 44
references had been made. 13 This figure appears rather bleakly against a backdrop of roundly
communautaire and integrationist judicial co-operation and significantly more references
Ireland has not yet implemented the Directive. At domestic level a challenge has been initiated by Digital Rights
Ireland, an interest group, against existing Irish data retention legislation on fundamental rights grounds and a
preliminary reference may yet be forthcoming.
11 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw).
12 The High Court has made slightly more references than the Supreme Court. Accordingly, of the 49 references,
22 were made by the High Court, 20 by the Supreme Court and the remaining few by inferior courts or non-court
tribunals. Therefore, for practical purposes, the High and Supreme Courts generate most of the references
between them.
13 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw).
10
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numerically at least from nearly every other State. 14 The Irish courts refer the least number of
cases per year across the Member States. 15 In certain subject areas, such as to the European
arrest warrant, the Irish courts may not seek a preliminary reference ruling from the Court of
Justice as the State has yet to make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 16
If we compare the total of 51 preliminary references over a thirty year period emanating from
the Irish courts to that of the other so-called small-sized EU states such as Denmark, Austria,
Finland and Portugal having regard to the first table above, 17 we find the overall number of
references from the Irish judiciary, from 1973 to the present day, to be relatively smaller than
from any of these small-sized countries individually. 18 Then from 2003-2008, discounting again
new accession States, the data for Irish preliminary references made in this period is still lesser
than that from other Member States.
Using Denmark as a comparator (which acceded to the Community in 1973 along with Ireland),
we see a significantly higher number of references in general from the Danish courts than their
Irish counterparts. The contrast is all the more striking as to Austria, which while only recently
acceding to membership of the EU, has gained notoriety for its courts keen usage of the Article
234 EC mechanism, with double the number of references from 1995-2001 that Denmark had
referred from 1973 to 2001.
Extreme reluctance has been displayed by some of the courts of the newer Member States to
engage in the preliminary reference dialogue with the Court of Justice. 19 On balance, “older”
pre-Nice Enlargement Member States appear to be involved in significantly more in preliminary
reference proceedings by way of observations before the Court of Justice than newer post-nice
Enlargement States, with the exception of Poland. 20 “Older” or Founding EU States are also
more likely to be engaged in extensive “defensive” behaviour before the Court of Justice in
preliminary reference proceedings, rarely missing an opportunity to set out their stall.
Political science theory would suggest that a pro-communautaire judicial regime would
generate many references, as would a fractious dynamic between lower and higher courts. 21
14 There are 2 exceptions to this: Sweden and Finland, both of which acceded in the 1995 wave of accessions and
thus have shorter periods of membership of the Union.
15 Source: Stone Sweet & Brunell “The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of
Preliminary References 1961-1995” (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 14/1997), available at
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
16 Thus the Irish State has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in respect of Third Pillar matters
pursuant to Article 35 EU. See OJ 2005 L 327 p. 19. See Fahey “Being a Third Pillar Guardian of Fundamental
Rights? The Irish Supreme Court and the European arrest warrant (2008) 33 European Law Review 563
17 Whose populations stand approximately respectively in 2004 (the figures on which the 30 year study are
predicated, itself ranging from 1973-2003) at:- Austria: 8.1 million, Denmark: 5.4 million, Finland: 5.2 million and
Portugal 10.4 million (Source: http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index.html). Even when we compare the Irish total to
that of Greece with a population of 2 ¾ times that of Ireland at 11 million approximately, which joined in 1980
seven years after the Irish Republic joined, we see a noticeably larger number of references made by the Hellenic
courts.
18 This is with the exception of Finland but it must be taken into account that Finland only joined the EU in 1995.
19 For example, in the case of Estonia this has been demonstrated to be the case: D’Sa & Lafranque “Getting to
Know You: The Developing Relationship between National Courts of the “Newer” Member States and the
European Court of Justice, with particular Reference to Estonia” (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 311.
20 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of
Justice” (2007) 10 European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11 European Judicial Review 52. See also L. Malferrari,
The Functional Representation of the Individuals’ Interests Before the EC Courts: The Evolution of the Remedies
System and the Pluralistic Deficit in the EC (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 667.
21 Alter Establishing the Supremacy of EC law (Oxford, 2001).
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Key doctrines such as supremacy and direct effect were already in existence upon Ireland
joining the EU in 1973 and a tension between ranks of courts is not discernible in the caselaw
generally. In so far as Article 234 is indicative of any trends, Ireland has a very low rate of
litigation where EU law is pleaded generally over a thirty year period and the preliminary
reference statistics reflect this general trend in turn. 22
(b) Transposition Deficits, Article 226 EC Infringement Proceedings and Ireland
It has been contended that the demand for involvement of the Court of Justice in national
litigation might also depend upon how governments implemented EC law 23 and so a high
number of warning letters would correspond with a high number of references. Golub argues
that States with poor implementation rates create situations where lawyers can easily question
the conformity of national measures with EC secondary legislation. 24 The publication of the
Internal Market Scoreboard is a recent phenomenon emanating from the European
Commission since 1997 as a means of gauging in both statistical and analytical format,
Member State compliance with State obligations as to implementing European legislation, i.e.
Single Market Directives.
Transposition deficits decreased markedly over a period of a decade, from 1992 to 2002,
corresponding closely to greater integration and economic prosperity achieved from the roll out
of the single market. In 1992, approximately 1 in 5 directives had not been transposed by
Member States. 25 Irish transposition compliance has ameliorated significantly in recent years,
reducing from a 5.4% to slightly above the aspired target of 1.5% in 2006. It has now reached
1% in 2008, although all Member States have dramatically increased non compliance with
Internal Market transposition recently and 18 States in fact in total have reached this 1% target
now. 26 However, Ireland along with Austria, UK and Poland has the highest number of open
infringement actions against it. In Environmental law cases, Ireland’s compliance with EU
legislation remains at its worst and from1998-2003, Ireland had the highest number of
infringement actions against it, topped only by Spain. 27 The reasons for this lack of compliance
are complex and multifarious but are frequently institutional or relate to the complexity of the
planning law process in this jurisdiction or the financial cost of proactive Environmental
management. Infringement actions involving Ireland thus potentially will decrease in the future
and Golub’s contentions are less than evident currently in the context of Irish European
litigation outside of Environmental law.
(c) Interventions by Member States in preliminary reference proceedings- Irish
observations

22 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw).
23 See Golub “Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European Community: The Quantitative Basis of Preliminary
References to the ECJ” (EUI Robert Schumann Centre Working Paper No. 58/96).
24 Golub op.cit.
25 See www.europa.eu.int.
26 Ibid.
27 See www.europa.eu.int and the Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
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Granger’s study of the number of observations made by national governments in preliminary
reference proceedings originating in their own courts in the period from 1995-1999, the Irish
government is shown to have made the lowest number of observations in such instances of all
the Member States, demonstrating low State participation and little attempt on its part to
influence EU policies at this level. 28 It has been shown that the Irish government makes a
below average number of observations in the areas of free movement of goods, person,
service, taxation, agriculture, approximation of laws, environment and consumers, competition,
principles of EC law, company law and external relations. In the area of social policy, however,
Ireland records an above average level of participation. 29 A substantial increase in the number
of interventions made in preliminary references and direct actions not relating to Ireland, ie
where Ireland was a party to the case, is evident in the last three years (2005-2008),
considered below in further detail. 30
In preliminary reference proceedings before the Court of Justice, Member States may submit
written observations and make oral arguments at the hearing. 31 Older EU States (pre-Nice
Enlargement) have tended to participate by way of observations in more preliminary reference
cases than newer States (post-Nice Enlargement), albeit that the gap is closing and that the
knowledge deficit must be overcome with time. 32 It has been suggested that Member States in
submitting observations in preliminary reference proceedings only do so defensively and/ or
limit their interventions to areas affecting the financial interests of their own States. 33 Others by
contrast do not miss an opportunity to participate, tending to comprise older States, wealthier
and larger States.
Ireland has been suggested to be a State that engages only in important domestic cases, but
bolstered by the ability to engage in seminal cases emanating from other Member States,
benefits from this cost-effective strategy. 34 From 1999-2003, Ireland made 18 observations in
preliminary reference proceedings. From 2003-2007, Ireland made 42 observations in
preliminary reference proceedings. Thus a multiple of interventions have been made in the
most recent period. This also corresponds to a slight increase in the number of preliminary
references emanating from Ireland in the same period. However, the increased figures in both
instances do not necessarily correlate in that the Irish State is making observations in
proceedings where the case does not emanate from the jurisdiction. The observations
submitted by the Irish State have mostly been in finance-related areas, for example in VAT
cases, and also in agriculture. Thus, the Irish State increasingly enters observations beyond
those cases originating domestically and statistically the State is now engaging in a multiple of
its previous intervention activities since 2003.
From this much it can be deduced that a “c-change” in attitude to European litigation on the
part of the Irish State is apparent and a more proactive and aggressive stance is being adopted
by the State.
Granger “When governments go to Luxembourg…: the influence of governments on the Court of Justice” (2004)
29 European Law Review 3, 8.
29 Noticeably, however, Granger does not offer a more defined explanation of “social policy”.
30 The preliminary reference rate in this period did not change, although the most active referring body is now the
Supreme Court. See Fahey op.cit..
31 Article 23 of the Statute of the Court and Article 104(4) of the Rules of Procedure.
32 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of
Justice” (2007) 10 European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11 European Judicial Review 52.
33 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of
Justice” (2007) 10 European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11 European Judicial Review 52.
34 Ibid.
28
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3. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE IRISH REFERENDA ON EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS

Table Source: The Irish Times
The Supreme Court decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach 35 of 1986 has entailed that a
referendum on European Treaty ratification has been held consistently since that decision,
which decided that a Treaty had to be submitted by referendum to the people where a
proposed Treaty altered the scope and objectives of the Union such that the initial popular
consent to European Union membership had been exceeded. Conservative analysis of the
decision of the split Supreme Court in Crotty has entailed that all Treaties subsequent to the
Single European Act have been submitted by plebiscite to the Irish people. The Irish electorate
has been broadly in favour of the European Union according to decades of Eurobarometer
polls and membership thereof has entailed that a high turnout in European related referenda
has been equated with the success thereof until recently. 36 The Third Amendment to the
Constitution Bill was passed by plebiscite in 1972 by 1,041,890 votes (82.4% of the voting
electorate) in favour of the amendment, 211,891 against. 37 The Maastricht Treaty was passed
by 68.7% of the electorate) in 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty was passed by 61.7% of the voting
electorate) (1993-1999), the Nice Treaty was passed on a 2nd successful (the first referendum
being unsuccessful) by 63% of the voting electorate. 38
The most recent Lisbon Treaty referendum was rejected by 53.4% of the population (862,415)
where the turnout was 53.1% (1,614,866), thereby precipitating a constitutional crisis of sorts at
national and European level. Evidence has tended to suggest that prior to the Lisbon Treaty,
that turnout was critical and that the higher the proportion of the electorate that voted, the
higher the likelihood of its success. This thesis would appear to have been disproven by the
[1987] IR 713.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm and Sinnott, Richard and Stephen Quinlan 'Soft Supporters
of the EU need to be inspired to vote Yes to Lisbon Treaty' The Irish Times, Wednesday 30 January 2008.
37 See Hogan & Whyte Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed., Lexis-Nexis, 2003) para 5.3.45 et seq.
38 See also Hourihane ed. Ireland and the European Union: The First Thirty Years 1973-2002 (Lilliput, 2003) and
Costello “Peoples’ Vengeances: Ireland’s Nice Referenda” (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 357.
35

36See
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Lisbon referendum, which was held on a weekday arguably inconveniencing some of the
working electorate or urban dwelling citizens or students residing away from their hometown
(and rural) constituencies, thereby discouraging travel for voting purposes. Middle class voters
tended to vote in favour of the Treaty, whereas working class voters tended to oppose the
treaty. The heightened anti European sentiments evident from the Treaty vote outcome in 2008
clearly indicate a shift in public opinion away from previous trends and popular support for the
Treaty rejection itself is apparent from recent opinion polls. 39
4. PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EUROPEAN UNION AFFAIRS IN IRELAND
A system of effectively organised domestic parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation is
now a commonplace feature of the legal and often constitutional orders of all European
Member States. 40 One of the most overdue yet fundamental legislative measures ever
introduced by the Irish Oireachtas is surely the European Union (Scrutiny) Act, 2002, enacted
to ensure greater scrutiny of EU legislation by the Houses of the Oireachtas. 41 However, the
legislative history of the Act of 2002 has interesting origins, relating to the redress the antiEuropean electoral feeling after the first failed Treaty of Nice referendum and not any
benevolent pro-European governmental sentiments. 42 Parliamentary scrutiny is not
constitutionally based unlike other States and the measures subjected to scrutiny remain
particularly limited in comparison with other jurisdictions. 43 The provisions of the Treaty of
Lisbon would significantly ameliorate the current provisions in Irish law relating to parliamentary
scrutiny of European-related legislation, should they take effect. The impact of a weak scrutiny
regime on litigation is complex. On one level, litigation might be expected to be more prevalent
in such an environment. This, however, need not necessarily be the case and the web of actors
involved in European litigation relating to any State is diverse and not readily explicable.
Nonetheless, major innovations in the relationship between States and the European Union
have been wrought through the dynamic parliamentary action and analysis (for example in the
UK, France and Germany), none of which are evident as to Ireland. 44
CONCLUSION

39

See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Review Of Scrutiny Of European Legislation
(First Report, 2002-2003, HL Paper 15, Appendix 4). See Fahey “Reflecting On The Scope Of The European
Union (Scrutiny) Act, 2002 and Parliamentary Scrutiny in the Draft Constitutional Treaty as to European Integration
and the Irish Legal Order” (2007) 13 European Public Law 66.
41Whilst a modest form of parliamentary legislative scrutiny had originally been in place at the inception of
Community membership, in the form of the European Communities Act, 1972, it in turn was to be amended on the
grounds on criticism as to its deficiencies: see Robinson “The Irish European Communities Act, 1972” (1973) 10
Common Market Law Review 352 and 467.
42 See Travers “The Reception of Community Legislation into Irish Law and Related Issues Revisited” (2003) 37
Irish Jurist 58.
43 Barrett “The king is dead, long live the king”: the recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the provisions of the
Constitutional Treaty concerning national parliaments (2008) 33 European Law Review 66 and
Barrett ed., National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and
Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press, 2008).
44
See Barrett ed., National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the
Oireachtas and Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press, 2008).
40
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Ireland has yet to establish itself as a repeat player in European litigation but discernible trends
in litigation are becoming more evident with the passage of time, trends that impact on the
analysis of Ireland litigating European affairs. The variety of actors involved in the web of
relationships making up such litigation before the Court of Justice entails that analysis is not
uncomplicated. The recent rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon underscores the shifting dynamic. It
seems likely that the Data Retention Case challenge indicates that the Irish State is asserting a
new constitutional position. However, a cumulative picture is difficult to present in advance of
an outcome to the Treaty of Lisbon ratification crisis.
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